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dc.contributor.authorPornsit Jirapornen_US
dc.contributor.authorYixin Liuen_US
dc.contributor.authorYoung S. Kimen_US
dc.description.abstractWe examine how CEO power affects the extent of analyst coverage. CEO power can influence a CEO's incentives to disclose information. The amount of information disclosed by the CEO in turn influences the information environment, which affects financial analysts' incentives to follow the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with more powerful CEOs experience less information asymmetry. Powerful CEOs are well insulated and have fewer incentives to conceal information, resulting in more transparency. The information provided to investors directly by the firm substitutes for the information in the analyst's report. As a result, the demand for analyst coverage is lower. Our results are important because they show that CEO power affects important corporate outcomes such as corporate transparency and analyst following. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.en_US
dc.subjectBusiness, Management and Accountingen_US
dc.subjectEconomics, Econometrics and Financeen_US
dc.titleHow Do Powerful CEOs Affect Analyst Coverage?en_US
article.title.sourcetitleEuropean Financial Managementen_US
article.volume20en_US State Universityen_US Universityen_US Universityen_US Mai Universityen_US System of New Hampshireen_US Kentucky Universityen_US
Appears in Collections:CMUL: Journal Articles

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